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ABSTRACT 
Time series of daily data for Greek sovereign risk have been 
compiled and analysed statistically to shed light on the way that 
historical events, including political and institutional changes, 
determined the creditworthiness of the Greek government on the 
London stock market from the start of the Great War until the Great 
Crash. No a priori important dates were specified. The Asia Minor 
campaign and its aftermath exerted a strongly negative impact on 
the value of Greek sovereign debt and as a result the risk premium 
increased rapidly. Statistical analysis shows that investors acted 
upon news of fiscal performance and public debt developments. 
Unforeseen political changes also influenced market participants’ 
expectations. By contrast, institutional innovations such as the 
adoption of the Gold Exchange Standard and the establishment of a 
central bank de novo did not result in any quantitative market 
response. However, stabilisation and the concomitant institutional 
reforms were gradually factored into the market price of Greek 
sovereign debt traded in London and as a result the creditworthiness 
of the Greek government steadily improved. 
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A Reflection of History: 
Fluctuations in Greek Sovereign Risk between 1914 and 1929 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to explore the way that historical events including 
political and institutional changes influenced market participants’ expectations 
of the capacity of the Greek government to honour its debt obligations, thereby 
determining Greek sovereign risk on the London market from the start of the 
Great War until the Great Crash. At a time when the sovereign debt crisis of the 
European periphery has made both policy makers and European Union citizens 
observe nervously the default risk of those countries, a historical perspective 
which combines a statistical analysis of the way that country risk has fluctuated 
in the past with an examination of the factors that influenced investors’ 
behaviour seems all the more essential. 
Three time series of Greek sovereign risk have been compiled by using newly 
collected data on Greek government loans denominated in gold and traded on 
the London Stock Exchange, benchmarked against the British consol. The data 
is from daily observations and was collected by hand from The London Times 
and the Stock Exchange Daily Official List.2 The three time series of country 
risk constructed were considered statistically in isolation from their historical 
                                                 
2
 The Times, British Library of Economic and Political Science; the Stock Exchange Daily Official List 
deposited at the Guildhall library. 
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context. No dates were specified a priori as significant. The period in question 
is historically complex. For Greece in particular it includes wars, military 
triumph and final defeat as well as political and monetary upheaval. It ends 
with Greece experiencing a period, albeit short-lived, of political and monetary 
stability.3  
The underlying assumption here is that information which affects a security's 
expected pay-off is incorporated into its price.4 Hence, this work contributes to 
the literature which combines historical data with statistical evidence, to 
examine the way that news interacts with capital markets to determine asset 
prices.5 It complements the existing literature by examining the period from the 
outbreak of the First World War until the advent of the Great Depression. In 
this way, it extends earlier analysis of the sovereign debt of economies during 
the classical period of the Gold Standard into an adjacent but very different 
historical era.6 The paper makes a further contribution through the data it 
employs. This is the first time that daily time series for Greek sovereign risk 
have been compiled and presented in such a systematic way. Finally, it 
introduces to the literature of economic history a new statistical method that 
can be used to detect time series breakpoints. 
                                                 
3
 For more on the historical period see Section 2. 
4
 Willard, Guinnane and Rosen (1996, p. 1002). See also Fama (1991).  
5
 Waldenstrom and Frey (2008); Frey and Waldenstrom (2004); Oosterlinck (2003); Brown Jr and 
Burdekin (2002); Weidenmier (2002); Brown Jr and Burdekin (2000); Frey and Kucher (2000a); 
Sussman and Yafeh (2000); Weidenmier (2000); Wells and Wills (2000); Willard, Guinnane and Rosen 
(1996) to name but a few. For a brief summary of papers mentioned above see Waldenstrom and Frey 
(2008, p.109) and Frey and Waldenstrom (2004, p. 51). 
6
 Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh (2006); Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh (2002); Sussman and Yafeh (2000). 
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The country risk time series analysed here show that military defeat and its 
aftermath exerted a strongly negative impact on the value of Greek sovereign 
debt traded on the London market and that consequently the Greek default risk 
soared. The statistical analysis demonstrates that announcements relating to the 
fiscal strength of the country and on public debt developments as well as 
unexpected political events in Athens did influence investors’ expectations. By 
contrast, the establishment of a central bank de novo and de jure introduction of 
the Gold Exchange Standard did not produce any quantitative market response. 
Research into the London press of the period establishes that market 
participants were able to stay very well informed about developments in 
Greece.7 Formal announcements on institutional changes such as the adoption 
of the Gold Exchange Standard and the establishment of a central bank could 
hardly contain new information. These reforms generally take a long time to be 
promulgated and need to be ratified by parliament. Market actors observed and 
evaluated every step taken towards reconstruction. As a result, stabilisation and 
the concomitant institutional reforms were gradually factored into the market 
price of Greek government debt traded on the London Stock Exchange and as a 
result the risk premium demanded by investors steadily fell.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
history of the period under consideration while Section 3 describes the data 
employed. The method followed in the statistical analysis is developed in 
Section 4 and the results are presented. In Section 5 the breakpoints located in 
                                                 
7
 See Christodoulaki and Penzer, (2004). 
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the time series are discussed and correlated to news that influenced investors’ 
expectations. The paper finishes with some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Historical Context  
When the guns fell silent on the western front late in 1918, Greece was on the 
winning side and its government was led by Eleftherios Venizelos. 
‘Unprecedented prosperity and reckless optimism’8 prevailed, as the end of the 
Great War coincided with territorial expansion and economic prosperity. The 
creation of a Greater Greece in the Near East, a long-standing national 
aspiration that had been embraced by most political leaders since 
Independence, seemed within reach. In May 1919 Greek troops disembarked in 
Smyrna and the Treaty of Sèvres granted Greece sovereignty over Thrace as far 
as the Chatalja line. At that time the drachma maintained its pre-war parity and 
had become a symbol of the country’s economic vigour.  
Careful analysis, however, shows up contradictory evidence of macroeconomic 
weakness. Between 1914 and 1919 the price level had more than tripled and the 
currency in circulation had increased more than fivefold. The increase in the 
money supply did not cause any concern to the monetary authorities, who 
believed at the time that the stability of the drachma was indisputable.  
The jubilation of victory at the end of the war temporarily concealed the extent 
of the national schism created by the greater conflict.9 This schism had literally 
                                                 
8
 Cited in Mazower (1991, p. 62); Mears (1929, p. 48).  
9
 For further details see Bochotis (1999, pp. 83-95); and Yanoulopoulos (1999, pp. 125-9). 
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split the country in two: the Premier of the country Eleftherios Venizelos had 
aspired to a policy of intervention on the side of the Allies while the King had 
been in favour of the country remaining neutral. The Premier believed in the 
final victory of the Entente, bring territorial gains to Greece, whilst the King 
had faith in Germany’s military supremacy. This crisis had come to a head in 
1916-17. King Constantine was forced to leave the country and in June 1917, 
the Venizelos government declared war on the Central Powers.  
A few months after the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres in November 1920, 
Venizelos was overwhelmingly defeated in a general election.10 This general 
election which brought the Populist Party to power, together with the 
unexpected death of the young King Alexander who had succeeded his father, 
paved the way for the return of the exiled King Constantine to Athens. 
Following a referendum held on 22nd November (Julian)/5th December 
(Gregorian)11 1920, King Constantine was officially returned to the Greek 
throne. Immediately, the Allied governments warned Athens that the 
repatriation of King Constantine meant that they no longer considered 
themselves bound by the Treaty of Sèvres. Greece would also encounter a 
financial embargo and cancellation of the war debt agreements.12 Political 
historiography and military . s relate subsequent events in Asia Minor to the 
                                                 
10
 For further details see Bochotis (1999, pp. 98-100); and Yanoulopoulos (1999, p. 132). 
11
 At the time, Greece was following the Julian calendar which lagged 13 days behind the Gregorian 
that was used by almost all of the rest of Europe. Greece introduced the Gregorian calendar on 16th 
February 1923, which thus became 1st March. During the period in question, when Greece was 
following the Julian calendar, dates are given for both calendars. It should be emphasized that the data 
collected, both the time series employed and the press cuttings gathered, come from London 
publications which used the Gregorian calendar. 
12
 Yanoulopoulos (1999, pp. 270-1); and History of the Greek Nation (1978, p. 150). For more on the 
war debt agreements or ‘Book Credits’ as they are known in the literature see Pantelakis (1988). 
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return of the pro-German King to the Greek throne. Careful examination, 
however, of geopolitical developments in the area in late 1920 does not support 
the view that the outcome of the election had a catalytic effect on the course of 
history.13   
The Greek army marched into the interior of Asia Minor meeting little 
resistance but giving time for Mustapha Kemal to prepare his army for an 
attack. In August 1922, the army of Ataturk launched its final offensive.14 
Hundreds of thousands of people fled the Turkish advance. Many of them 
headed to Smyrna believing that they would be protected there. On 27th August 
(Julian)/9th September (Gregorian), the Turkish army entered Smyrna in 
pursuit. What followed is vividly described in history books and in the press of 
the day. The panic and desperation culminated on 31st August (Julian)/13th 
September (Gregorian) when Smyrna was set ablaze. A mass of destitute 
refugees, allegedly 300,000 people, had already gathered at the port, 
desperately seeking any kind of craft on which to escape the horror.15 As a 
consequence hundreds of thousands of refugees, chiefly women, children and 
old men arrived on the Greek islands near Asia Minor or reached Pireaus. In 
January 1923, a convention was signed at Lausanne which provided for a 
compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, recognising 
in this way, a process that to a great extent had already occurred.16 In a very 
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 Yanoulopoulos (1999, p. 273). 
14
 For more on the Greek campaign in Asia Minor see Margaritis, (1999, pp. 177-86); and History of 
the Greek Nation (1978, pp. 157-233).  
15
 History of the Greek Nation (1978, pp. 236-9). 
16
 Mazower (1991, pp. 61-2); and Pentzopoulos (1962, p. 61-71).  
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short period of time, the population of Greece had increased by twenty per 
cent.17   
The ‘Catastrophe,’ as the Asia Minor debacle is known in Greece, had an 
immediate impact upon Greek politics. A faction of military officers, 
supporters of Venizelos, formed a Revolutionary Committee, deposed the 
Royalist government in Athens and assumed power on 15th (Julian)/28th 
September (Gregorian) 1922. King Constantine was forced to abdicate, this 
time in favour of his eldest son, and left Athens for the last time.  
At first, private initiative and philanthropic organisations provided relief for 
refugees. It soon became apparent, however, that huge re. s would be needed 
for the resettlement of the more than a million people, who had by this time 
crossed the Aegean Sea from Asia Minor. As Figures 1 and 2 show, late in 
1922 the creditworthiness of the Greek government on the London market was 
very low. Greek sovereign risk had rocketed to nearly 21 per cent, reflecting 
the political, economic and financial distress that prevailed in Athens. In 
February 1923 Greece approached the Council of the League of Nations hoping 
to float an international loan under its aegis for the settlement of refugees. The 
negotiations with the League were protracted and the Geneva Protocol was 
only signed in September 1923.18 The League scheme implemented in Greece 
as a result was mainly confined to the settlement of refugees. 
                                                 
17
 For more on the impact of refugees on the Greek economy see Hadziiossif (2002, pp. 8-57). 
18
 For further information see Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, pp. 64-99); and Minoglou Pepelasi (1989, pp. 
331-66).  
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Figure 1. Railways & Refugee Loans, 1914-1929 
 
Notes: Sovereign risk is defined as the yield difference between the Greek loan indicated above and the British consol. 
Sources: See text.
 9 
 
The period that followed the Asia Minor campaign is characterised by political 
and monetary instability.19  One short-lived government after another assumed 
control of the country until June 1925, when General Pangalos with the help of 
a few officers seized power and established a dictatorship. Fourteen months 
later, General Pangalos was himself overthrown by a military coup d’état 
organised by another officer, General Condylis. Condylis immediately declared 
himself in favour of a return to normal political conditions by holding 
parliamentary elections. In December 1926 and for the first time since 1915, 
Venizelists and Anti-Venizelists, Republicans and Monarchists co-operated and 
formed a coalition government. The priority that united these politicians, in 
spite of their deep-rooted differences, was the stabilisation of the drachma, the 
Greek currency having lost approximately 95 per cent of its pre-war value by 
mid-December 1926.  
In the Spring of 1927 the Greek authorities resorted to the League of Nations 
for a second time to obtain an international loan under its auspices to stabilise 
the drachma and to continue the work of settling the refugees. The 
reconstruction scheme prepared by the Financial Committee was a typical 
League stabilisation plan, comprising as it did institutional reforms focused 
mainly on the central banking system and the flotation of an international loan. 
In the Greek example, however, there was a domestic twist on the League’s 
norms; reorganisation of the issuing bank in Greece, as recommended by the 
Financial Committee, led to the establishment of a fully-fledged central bank 
                                                 
19
 For the political conditions see Daphnes (1955). 
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de novo. The Bank of Greece opened its doors for business on 14th May 1928, 
two days after the drachma was de jure stabilised.20   
 
3. Overview of the Data 
Three time series, each representing a Greek Government loan denominated in 
gold and traded on the London market, the most important borrowing market 
for the Greek government in the 1920s, have been compiled. All three loans 
were issued after the establishment of the International Financial Commission. 
They are known as the Railways Loan, the Bonds Loan and the Refugee Loan, 
the latter floated in late 1924.21 In addition, data has been collected on the 
British consol as a default-free government loan in order to construct time 
series for Greek sovereign risk. The three Greek government loans concerned 
are presented in Table 1.  
In spite of the economic and monetary turmoil in the country, the Greek 
government serviced its debt obligations throughout the period in question here 
according to the terms and conditions laid down at the outset. In fact, both the 
Railways and the Refugee loans were under the direct control of a nineteen-
century institution, the International Financial Commission, which was 
                                                 
20
 For more on the establishment of the Bank of Greece see Christodoulaki (2002). 
21
 Greek public debt denominated in gold and traded on stock exchanges during the period in question 
can be divided into three categories. The first category consists of the ‘Old Loans’ as the loans 
contracted before the introduction of the Law of Control in 1898 are known. The second category 
includes loans that were issued after 1898 and placed under the aegis of the International Financial 
Commission. Finally, the third category comprises of loans that were not issued under the supervision 
of the I.F.C. The interest rate paid each year on the ‘Old Loans’ fluctuated between the minimum rate 
defined by the Law of Control and the original nominal interest rate of the loan. For this reason no 
loans issued before 1898 have been included here. For more information on the loans issued before 
1898 see Christodoulaki and Penzer (2004, pp. 15-16 and p. 60).  
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responsible for servicing the loans under its care. The International Financial 
Commission (I.F.C.) was an international body, established in 1898 under the 
Law of Control that was introduced following the Greek government’s default 
in 1893. Its members were originally appointed by the governments of Great 
Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Russia.22 This 
Commission assumed responsibility for servicing the Greek public debt that 
was placed under its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Greek government assigned 
a large part of its public revenues to the I.F.C., which administered them in 
accordance with the terms of the Law of Control.23  
Table 1. Description of the Loans 
 Railways Loan Bonds Loan Refugee Loan 
Year of Issue 1902 & 1904 1910 1924 
Amortisation (years) 98 50 40 
Coupon Rate 4 % 4 % 7 % 
Sum Authorised £2,250,000 £5,955,000 £12,300,000 
Sum Issued £2,183,280 £4,367,000 £12,300,000 
Price of Issue 83.50%1 86.50 % 88 %2 
Comments 
Purchases possible if quoted below par.  
Repayable at par by ballot every six months.  
Notes: 1 The March 1902 issue was at 83½ per cent whilst the amount that was floated in 
June 1904 was at 84 per cent. 2 Price of issue in London and New York. The portion floated 
in Athens was issued at 86 per cent.  
Sources: Wynne (1951, pp. 347-50); Andreades (1939); Aggelopoulos (1937); Stefanides 
(1930); The Stock Exchange Year –Book (1928, pp. 146-7); The Stock Exchange Official 
Intelligence (1928, pp. 124-5); and Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1926, pp. 199-
203). 
                                                 
22
 After 1921, the I.F.C. was confined to members from Great Britain, France and Italy.  
23
 Wynne (1951, pp. 320-5); Andreades (1939, pp. 482-6); and United Kingdom, House of Commons 
(1898, pp. 11-3). 
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The flotation of the Railways Loan was authorised by law in 1900 and was 
aimed at the construction and running of a railway from Piraeus to Demerly. 
The sum authorised was 2,250,000 pounds sterling. In the end a total of 
£2,183,280 was issued at a four per cent interest rate. A first tranche of the loan 
was issued in March 1902 at 83½ per cent and later, in June 1904, a second was 
floated at 84 per cent.24   
This was the first attempt by the Greek government to raise capital from the 
international financial markets since the introduction of the Law of Control in 
1898. Therefore, it was placed under the direct control of the I.F.C. and special 
attention was paid to the guarantees assigned. The Railways Loan was 
redeemable at par over a period of ninety eight years in tranches drawn by lot 
every six months or by purchase in the open market, if the price was below par. 
The Greek government reserved the right to pay off all outstanding bonds at par 
at any time on six months’ notice.  
The Bonds Loan was authorised by the Law of 19th March 1910. Its interest 
rate was four per cent and was redeemable at par in fifty years by lot twice a 
year commencing in 1912 or by purchase when the price was below par. The 
Greek government could increase the sinking fund or pay off all or part of the 
loan at par after January 1921 on at least three months’ notice. Although this 
                                                 
24
 For more see The Stock Exchange Official Intelligence (1928, p. 124); Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders (1926, pp. 199-200); The Stock Exchange Official Intelligence (1916, p. 117); Stefanides 
(1930, p. 201). 
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loan was secured by the surplus of tax revenues assigned to the I.F.C. it was not 
placed under their direct control.25 
The Refugee Loan was issued under the auspices of the League of Nations late 
in 1924. This loan was raised to provide funds for the resettlement of refugees 
who came to the country after the Asia Minor debacle. A special body, the 
Refugee Settlement Commission, was established to administer the proceeds of 
this loan. The Refugee Settlement Commission was an autonomous body, its 
statutes having been developed by the Financial Committee of the League of 
Nations and it was under the strict supervision of the League Council.26 The 
total sum issued was £12,300,000. The price at issue was 88 per cent in London 
and New York and 86 per cent in Athens.27 A substantial part of the loan 
(£7,500,000) was issued in London. The rest was floated in almost equal parts 
in Athens and New York.   
The Refugee Loan was under the direct control of the International Financial 
Commission.28 Principal was repayable at par over a period of forty years by 
ballot every six months commencing September 1925.29  The Greek 
government could increase its redemption after May 1936. It could also pay off 
the Refugee Loan on giving three months’ prior notice.  
                                                 
25
 Wynne (1951, p.348); Andreades (1939, pp. 552-4); Aggelopoulos (1937, p. 30); Stefanides (1930, 
pp. 202-3); The Stock Exchange Official Intelligence (1928, p. 124); Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders (1926, p.201); The Stock Exchange Official Intelligence (1916, p.118). 
26
 For more information on the Refugee Loan see Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, pp. 64-99); Minoglou 
Pepelasi (1989); Wynne (1951, pp. 349-50); League of Nations (1945, pp. 74-6); and Stefanides (1930, 
pp. 234-5). 
27
 League of Nations (1945, p. 167). 
28
 For the revenues assigned for the service of this loan see The Stock Exchange Year-Book (1928, pp. 
146-7); The Stock Exchange Official Intelligence (1928, pp. 124-5); Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders (1926, pp. 202-3). 
29
 The Times, ‘Greek Government 7% Refugee Loan of 1924’, 8th December 1924. 
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Moody’s Manual of Investments which at the time furnished investors with ‘a 
key to the relative security and stability of particular investment bonds’ valued 
the Refugee Loan as a safer investment than the other two Greek loans 
examined. Under their system of ratings, the Refugee Loan had a ‘Baa’ rating 
whilst the Railways Loan and the Bonds Loan had a ‘Ba’.30  
All the time series compiled for this paper are composed of daily observations 
collected by hand from . s extensively used by contemporaneous market 
participants to assess the creditworthiness of the Greek government. The 
Railways and the Bonds Loan data come from The Times whilst the .  of the 
Refugee Loan data is the Stock Exchange Daily Official List.31 They represent 
each day’s final transaction as a percentage of par value. It should be noted that 
this is the first time that time series of daily data of Greek government bonds 
have been compiled and presented in such a systematic way.32  
The Refugee Loan time series employed starts on 29th April 1925, the first day 
that this loan was traded on the London Stock Exchange and finishes on 31st 
December 1929. By contrast with all other Greek loans traded on the London 
market, this loan was traded every day that the London Stock Exchange was 
open during the entire period in question. In fact, if the number of transactions 
                                                 
30
 Moody’s rating system (from highest to lowest) was: Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa, Ca, C. See 
Moody (1926, pp. vii-xi, and p. 550). 
31
 The Times British Library of Economic and Political Science; the Stock Exchange Daily Official List 
deposited at the Guildhall library. 
32
 The first time that market prices of Greek government loans were presented in a systematic way was 
in Christodoulaki and Penzer (2004) where monthly data for three government loans namely the 
Monopoly Loan, the Bonds Loan and the 1914 Loan covering the period 1914 to 1929 and daily data of 
the Refugee Loan from 1925 until 1929 are analysed. Previous references in the literature to market 
prices of Greek government loans traded on the London Stock Exchange had been sporadic and failed 
to paint a fair picture of the period to which they refer. See for example Lazaretou (2005, pp. 229-30); 
Kostis (2003, p. 216); and Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 73). 
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that took place each day is used as a yardstick, then the seven per cent Greek 
Refugee Loan was one of the most popular loans on the London market.  
The Railways Loan attracted investors’ interest more than any other Greek loan 
issued before 1914. However, neither the Railways nor the Bonds loans were 
traded every working day of the London Stock Exchange during the period in 
question. See Table 6 in the Appendix for the total number of days each year 
that these two loans were traded on the London market. Therefore, for the 
period between 1914 and April 1925 when trading of the Refugee Loan 
commenced, two Greek loans, the Railways and the Bonds Loan, have been 
employed to examine how news influenced investors’ expectations of the 
default risk of the Greek government. For the remaining period up to the end of 
December 1929 the Refugee Loan has been used. The three time series are 
plotted on Figures 1 and 2. On 30th July 1914 the outbreak of the First World 
War caused the London Stock Exchange to close and business was not resumed 
until early January 1915. Therefore the statistical analysis of the Railways Loan 
begins in January 1915 and finishes in April 1925.33  
The analysis of the Bonds Loan starts even later in March 1917 (as there was 
no trading activity between April 1914 and February 1917) and ends in April 
1925.34   
                                                 
33
 To be specific the analysis of the Railways Loan covers the period between 21st January 1915 and 
28th April 1925. In total during this period there are 571 observations available. 
34
 There was trade in the Bonds Loan in the early months of 1914 although it was infrequent. The 
analysis of the Bonds Loan starts on 19th March 1917 and finishes on 27th April 1925. During this 
period as Table 6 in Appendix I shows, the Bonds Loan was traded on the London Stock Exchange on 
361 days.  
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British consols have been used as default free bonds to construct time series of 
Greek sovereign risk. The time series of consols is composed of daily 
observations, which again represent the final transaction as a percentage of par 
value. They have been collected by hand from the same . s used for the Greek 
government loans.35 Special attention was paid to ensuing that the Greek loan 
and the matched consols were transactions that took place on the same date.  
Figure 2. Bonds Loan 
 
Note: Sovereign risk is defined as the yield difference between the Bonds Loan and the 
British consol. 
Sources: See text. 
 
The sovereign risk can be defined as the yield differential between government 
bonds and the British consol or alternatively as a ratio of the yield of a 
government loan and the British consol. In the statistical analysis employed 
here the ratio of the yield of the Greek government bonds and the British 
                                                 
35
 For the period between 1914 and April 1925 the data on consols comes from The Times whilst for the 
remaining period the source is the Stock Exchange Daily Official List.  
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consol has been used. There are, however, references to sovereign risk as a 
yield differential, since it illustrates investors’ expectations of Greek 
government default risk more vividly. Both the Greek bonds’ and the consols’ 
yield was calculated by dividing the coupon rate by the market price. This is 
the best approximation of yield for bonds with an amortisation period of 
between forty and ninety eight years. More importantly, repayment of the 
principal of all the three loans concerned was made by ballot twice a year and 
purchase of bonds of the Railways and the Bonds loans was also possible if the 
market price was below par value. 
Archival material shows that policymakers in Greece observed the market price 
movements of the 1914 Loan and the Bonds Loan in order to evaluate the 
country’s creditworthiness on the London market.36 It also reveals that the 
National Bank of Greece, possibly in co-operation with the government, 
attempted to manipulate the market prices of Greek bonds twice during the 
period in question.37 Certainly an organised intervention by the National Bank 
began in September 1924, three months before the flotation of the Refugee 
Loan.38 A second intervention seems to have been planned to coincide with the 
issue of the Stabilisation Loan in January 1928.39 The information available on 
these two market adjustments is summarised in Table 2.  
                                                 
36
 Emmanuel Tsouderos Archive, Bank of Greece, File 22: Tripartite Loan of 1928, 61: Document 
undated signed by Diomides, p.2. 
37
 Emmanuel Tsouderos Archive, Bank of Greece, File 22: Tripartite Loan of 1928, 61: Document 
undated signed by Diomides; Alexandros Diomides Archive, Greek Literary and History Archive, File 11, 
Document 16: Diomides writes to Kaphandares, 22nd December, 1927. 
38
 The London portion of the Refugee Loan was issued in early December 1924.  
39
 The Stabilisation Loan was issued on 31st January 1928 under the aegis of the League of Nations.  
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Table 2. Support Purchases 
 Sum Allocated 
for Bond 
Purchases 
 
Loans Targeted 
Amount Quoted 
of Loans 
Targeted in 
London 
Total Amount of 
Greek Loans 
Quoted in 
London3 
September 1924  
– Not Known1  
 
£630,000 
1914 Loan 
Bonds Loan 
   £883,9002 
£3,943,6192 £24,600,909
4
 
Early 1928 £170,000 Not Known  £44,887,4595 
Notes: 1 Market interventions must have been terminated early in December 1924 before the 
flotation of the Refugee Loan. 2 In September 1924. 3 The 1898 Loan is not included. The 
amount quoted for the 1898 Loan was £3,751,000 in September 1924 and £3,150,800 in 
January 1928. 4 This sum refers to September 1924 and includes the following loans: the 
1881 Loan, the 1884 Loan, the 4% Monopoly Loan, the 4% Rentes Loan, the 1890 Loan, the 
Funding Loan of 1893, the Railways Loan of 1902, the National Loan of 1907, the Bonds 
Loan and the 1914 Loan. 5 This refers to January 1928 and includes the above loans plus the 
Refugee Loan of 1924. 
Sources: See text; The Investor’s Monthly Manual (January 1928, p. 12); The Investor’s 
Monthly Manual (September 1924, p. 519).  
 
4. Detecting Breakpoints 
Banerjee, Lumsdaine & Stock (1992)40 propose a sequential four-step 
procedure for detecting structural breakpoints in time series data. This method 
essentially involves fitting autoregressive models in a moving window and 
identifying breaks sequentially. This four-step technique and its variations have 
been used in a growing number of papers which use historical time series to 
identify structural changes.41 This structural break detection process, however, 
involves some rather arbitrary choices including the order of the autoregression 
and the width of the window. 
                                                 
40
 Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock (1992). 
41
 Among the papers that have adopted this four-step technique are the following: Grossman and Imai 
(2009); Burdekin (2006); Frey and Waldenstrom (2004); Oosterlinck (2003); Mauro, Sussman and 
Yafeh (2002); Brown Jr (2002); Brown Jr and Burdekin (2000); Frey and Kucher (2000a); Frey and 
Kucher (2000b); Sussman and Yafeh (2000); Wells and Wills (2000); Willard, Guinnane and Rosen 
(1996).  
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The method applied here to detect breakpoints in the time series of Greek 
sovereign risk was developed in Cho & Fryzlewicz (2011),42 which differs 
from the Banerjee, Lumsdaine & Stock four-step technique mainly in that it 
does not involve a subjective choice of window size.  
 
4.1. Railways Loan Time Series Analysis  
The Railways Loan dataset used covers the period from 21st January 1915 to 
28th April 1925, though trading was uneven during this period with 
transactions occurring on 571 days out of a possible 3,060. The concatenation 
of the available data points is treated as the dataset in our analysis below. 
Denote the time series of length T=571 as { . Since  is a time series with 
a very high degree of autocorrelation (which makes it challenging to detect 
breakpoints in its mean or trend), we first difference , which reduces the 
autocorrelation, and look for changes in its variance by observing the behaviour 
of the ‘local’ variance estimate  See Figure 3, where  and 
 are compared. In a simple example, suppose for a moment that  and are 
two independent random variables satisfying   with independent and 
identically distributed  from a standard normal distribution. 
Then we have 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 Cho and Fryzlewicz (2011).  
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i.e. the unknown mean of  is cancelled out by taking the difference between 
and  which can be estimated by . 
Figure 3. Railways Loan Times Series:  (left) and  (right) 
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Notes: 1 Sovereign risk is defined here as the ratio of the yield of the Railways Loan and the 
British Consol. 2 The solid bold line is the estimated local variance of ( ). 
 
In reducing the problem of detecting breakpoints in the variance of  to 
detecting those in the expectation of , the CUSUM-type breakpoint detection 
procedure from Cho & Fryzlewicz (2011) is applied to .43 
The procedure was developed for detecting breakpoints in a multiplicative 
model of the following form 
                                                 
43
 See Cho and Fryzlewicz (2011). 
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 = ,  t=1, … , T, (1) 
where  is a piecewise constant sequence (which corresponds to the 
expectation of ) and {  are (possibly correlated) standard normal 
variables. 
The first step of the procedure is to find the most likely location for a 
breakpoint. We locate such a point among b {1, …, T-1} as the one which 
maximises the following: 
 
 
(2) 
 
=  
 
 
where  is interpreted as the difference between the local means of over the 
two segments {1, …, b} and {b+1, …, T}, adjusted by a multiplicative factor 
of the form . This factor is chosen so that, in the ideal case of being 
i.i.d. random variables, the variance of remains constant over b. Similar 
CUSUM statistics have been adopted in the context of breakpoint detection, 
such as in Brodsky & Darkhovsky (1993), Venkatraman (1993) and Inclán & 
Tiao (1994), to name but three.44 However, one chief difference between the 
aforementioned and Cho & Fryzlewicz (2011) is that, in the latter {  be 
autocorrelated. 
                                                 
44
 Inclán and Tiao (1994); Brodsky and Darkhovsky (1993); Venkatraman (1993). 
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Once it is found that ∈{1, …, T} as where is maximised, i.e. 
 
 =    
then  can be used to test the null hypothesis of being constant over t∈{1, 
…, T}. In Cho & Fryzlewicz (2011), the test statistic and its critical value are 
designed in such a way that, if a breakpoint is present in a given interval, the 
null hypothesis is rejected with probability converging to 1. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, the simultaneous locating and testing of breakpoints is 
repeated separately on the two segments to the left and right of  i.e. {  
and { , in a recursive manner until no further breakpoints are detected.  
When breakpoint detection is complete, a post-processing procedure follows, 
so as to further equip the testing procedure with an extra step aimed at reducing 
the risk of overestimating the number of breakpoints. That is, at each 
breakpoint, the CUSUM test statistic of the same form as in (2) is re-calculated 
over the segment defined by its two adjacent breakpoints and compared with 
the test criterion again. It is shown in Cho & Fryzlewicz (2011) that the 
combined use of the CUSUM test and a post-processing step correctly detects 
both the total number and the locations of breakpoints under the multiplicative 
model (1) with probability approaching one. 
When the procedure described above was applied to , it returned t=25 (28 
March 1916), t=143 (26 March 1920), t=338 (7 February 1923) and t=475 (19 
May 1924) as breakpoints, in the sense that they each represent the end point of 
a segment over which the variance of  was constant. The right hand panel of 
  23
Figure 3 shows the local variance of  estimated as the local mean over each 
stationary segment ( . 
4.2. Bonds Loan Time Series Analysis  
The Refugee Loan time series offers a complete dataset with 1,180 
observations covering the period from 29th April 1925 until 31st December 
1929. Due to its particular statistical features described below, the Refugee 
Loan dataset was analysed differently from the previous two time series.  
Figure 4. Bonds Loan Time Series:  (left) and  (right). 
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Notes: 1 Sovereign risk is defined here as the ratio of the yield of the Bonds Loan and the 
British Consol. 2 The solid bold line is the estimated local variance of ( ). 
 
4.3. Refugee Loan Time Series Analysis 
The Refugee Loan time series offers a complete dataset with 1,180 
observations covering the period from 29th April 1925 until 31st December 
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1929. Due to its particular statistical features described below, the Refugee 
Loan dataset was analysed differently from the previous two time series.  
(A) Removing the regular spikes 
A key feature of the Refugee Loan daily time series is its biannual spikes. 
Figure 5 which is a plot of the difference in the time series represented 
by , captures graphically these biannual spikes which occur on the 
last day of each April and October that the London Stock Exchange was open. 
See also Table 3 where the spikes identified are presented.  
Figure 5. Refugees Loan Time Series 
 
Refugees Loan Time Series: -  
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Note: The first figure presents the time series of the Railways Loan sovereign risk as a ratio. 
The second figure is the plot of - . The vertical dotted lines denote the spikes. 
 
 
Table 3. Regularly Spaced Biannual Spikes in the Refugee Loan Time Series 
 Events 
30th April (Thursday), 1925   
30th October (Friday), 1925  Coupons and bonds 
30th April (Friday), 1926  drawn by lot were honoured at 
29th October (Friday), 1926  par following 1st May and 
29th April (Friday), 1927  1st November each year. 
31st October (Monday), 1927   
30th April (Monday), 1928   
31st October (Wednesday), 1928   
30th April (Tuesday), 1929          
Note: T=1141 which coincides with 31st October 1929, is not included as a spike since, 
unlike in previous years, no sharp upward movement is observed. The difference is explained 
by the turmoil that the Great Crash on the New York stock exchange created on the 
international financial markets. Nevertheless, it is important to note that even if t=1141 is 
included in the statistical analysis as a spike the outcome remains identical.  
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These biannual spikes in the Refugee Loan time series coincide with coupon 
payments and redemption of bonds drawn by lot. From 1st May and 1st 
November each year coupons were paid off at Hambros Bank in London, 
whilst at the same time bonds drawn by lot for redemption could be 
redeemed.45  Consequently, these biannual, regularly spaced spikes have been 
removed from the dataset before any further analysis is carried out. 
 
(B) Detecting breakpoints in the variance 
After the spikes have been removed from the dataset of the Refugee Loan, the 
breakpoints in the variance of  are detected by applying the CUSUM-type 
testing procedure to . As a result, two breakpoints are 
returned at t=47 (6th July 1925) and t=1123 (7th October 1929). See Figure 6 
and Table 5 below where these two breakpoints are presented. 
Subsequently, these breakpoints are used to estimate the local variance 
of ) as the local mean over each stationary segment ( ). Finally, this 
estimate is used to compute the ‘variance-stabilised’ version of , 
 
 
(3) 
 
                                                 
45
 Draws of bonds of the Refugee Loan took place in Athens twice a year in March and September, 
commencing in September 1925. The numbers drawn were announced in the press including British 
newspapers, so that repayment could be make at par after 1st May and 1st November respectively each 
year. 
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Figure 6. Refugee Loan Time Series:  
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Note: 1 The solid bold line is the estimated local variance of ( ). 
 
 
(C) Removing the linear trend from the data 
As can be seen in the left-hand panel of Figure 7, there is a strong downward 
linear trend in  as obtained in (3). Indeed, the outcome from performing 
simple linear regression over time shows that there is a significant linear trend 
in . See also Table 4. Therefore, the trend is removed from and the 
residuals after de-trending are denoted by  See the right-hand panel of Figure 
7. 
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Figure 7. Refugees Loan Time Series: obtained as in (3) (left) and obtained 
after removing the linear trend from  (right). 
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Note: 1 The linear trend is in a solid line.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Refugees: simple linear regression fit of   over time. 
Coefficients Estimate Std. error t value 
 
Intercept -2.8874441 0.2796638 -10.32 
 
Time -0.0971146 0.0004137 -234.72 
 
Residual standard error: 4.78 on 1168 degrees of freedom 
Multiple : 0.9792 Adjusted : 0.9792 
F-statistic:  on 1 and 1168 DF p-value:  
 
(D) Fitting an AR(2) model to the residuals 
In order to study the behaviour of , its autocorrelation (acf) and partial 
autocorrelation (pacf) functions are plotted in Figure 8. The acf on the left-hand 
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panel shows that  is strongly autocorrelated and the pacf on the right hand 
panel shows that  may be well explained by an autoregressive (AR) process 
of order 2. 
Figure 8: Refugees Loan Time Series: autocorrelation (left) and partial 
autocorrelation (right) functions of . 
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To confirm this observation, an AR(2) process was fitted to ; the residuals 
comfortably passed the Ljung-Box test for lack of serial correlation. Therefore, 
we concluded that no further systematic pattern was present in the data.  
To summarise, the Refugee Loan time series of sovereign risk has regular 
upward spikes which appear biannually, and once those spikes are removed, the 
remaining dataset provides two breakpoints in the variance, on 6th July 1925 
and 7th October 1929 respectively. When the variance of the data is stabilised, 
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there is a strong downward linear trend in the data, and once the linear trend is 
removed, the residuals can be modelled as an AR(2) process. Since the final 
residuals are well-explained by a stationary AR(2) process, it is implied that 
there are no further structural breakpoints to be detected from the Refugee 
Loan time series. 
 
5. Breakpoints and Historical Events 
 Table 5 presents the breakpoints detected by the statistical analysis of the three 
Greek sovereign risk time series employed here. The second column of this 
table refers to the historical events that correlate in time with the breakpoints 
identified.  
The two time series of sovereign risk analysed here, those relating to the 
Railways and Bonds loans respectively, which cover the period between 1914 
and April 1925 as shown by Figures 1 and 2, present a consistent picture of the 
period in question in spite of some differences. The statistical analysis confirms 
this discrepancy in the behaviour of the two loans. This difference in the 
behaviour of the two loans could be a ‘guide to the labyrinth’46 of Greek public 
debt whilst at the same time demonstrating the complexity of the markets. It is 
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, in particular with the weaker 
form of this hypothesis.47   
                                                 
46
 The Economist,  27th January, 1923. 
47
 See Fama (1991).  
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The discrepancy in the behaviour of the two loans could be explained by their 
different attributes, some of which are not always readily apparent. For 
example, the seniority sequence in the service of these two loans was 
dissimilar: the Railways Loan was under the direct control of the I.F.C. but the 
Bonds Loan, despite being secured by public revenues assigned to the 
Commission, was not placed under their direct control. Knowing the identity of 
the ultimate buyers and sellers of Greek government bonds on the London 
Stock Exchange would also shed light on why there is a discrepancy in the 
behaviour of the two time series. 
Table 5: Correlation of Breakpoints to Historical Events, 1914-1925 
Breakpoints Historical Events 
Railways Loan  
28th March (Tue)/10th April (Mon), 1916 See text. 
26th March (Fri)/29th March (Mon), 1920  Asia Minor Campaign. 
7th February (Wed)/9th February (Fri), 1923  See text. 
19th May (Mon)/22nd May (Thu), 1924 Public Debt Developments. 
Bonds Loan  
16th December (Tue), 1919/ 
           6th January (Tue), 1920 Asia Minor Campaign/Fiscal News. 
15th November (Mon)/ 
           16th November (Tue), 1920 
The General Election of 14th November 
(Gregorian), 1920 
13th October (Fri)/ 
           17th October (Tue), 1922 
Immediate (political) aftermath  
of the Asia Minor Debacle.  
23rd January (Tue) / 
           12th February (Mon), 1923 See text. 
6th December (Thu)/ 
           27th December (Thu), 1923 
Events Surrounding the General Election of 
16th December 1923. 
15th December (Mon)/ 
           16th December (Tue), 1924  Flotation of the Refugee Loan in London. 
25th March (Wed)/ 
           26th March (Thu) , 1925 See text. 
Refugee Loan 
6th (Monday)/7th July (Tuesday), 1925 
Events following the coup d’état  
of 25th June 1925. 
7th (Monday)/8th October (Tuesday), 1929 See text. 
Source: See text. 
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Both time series demonstrate that during the First World War Greek sovereign 
risk remained low. The Asia Minor campaign, acting perhaps as a proxy of 
fiscal performance, prompted a continuous increase in the risk premium of 
Greek government debt. By the end of the Asia Minor campaign, Greek 
sovereign risk had rocketed, reflecting the debacle and its aftermath in a 
striking fashion. In early 1923, as both loans’ datasets show, risk premium 
started falling and the statistical analysis of the Refugee Loan country risk time 
series reveals a strong linear downward trend in this dataset. By the end of the 
period in question, Greek country risk had decreased considerably but still 
remained higher than it had been at the beginning of 1914. 
The statistical analysis of the three daily time series examined here shows that 
investors acted upon news of fiscal performance and public debt developments. 
Political events and in particular unanticipated political changes also influenced 
bondholders’ behaviour. By contrast, institutional innovations, such as the 
adoption of the Gold Exchange Standard and the establishment of a central 
bank de novo, did not produce any quantitative market response. Stabilisation 
and the concomitant institutional reforms, however, did become factored into 
the market price of Greek sovereign debt traded in London and consequently 
Greek sovereign risk reduced. 
Statistical analysis indicates that the two organised interventions of the 
National Bank to manipulate market prices of Greek government bonds in 
London, as described in Table 2, did not produce any statistically significant 
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market reaction that would indicate a change in the behaviour of market 
participants. As Table 5 shows, no breakpoints were detected during the period 
in which the National Bank attempted to improve the market price of Greek 
sovereign debt and thus to influence the terms for further borrowing by the 
Greek government on the London market. One of the two loans targeted by the 
market interventions of the National Bank in the autumn of 1924 was the 
Bonds Loan analysed here. It is, however, unlikely that the breakpoint detected 
in mid-December 1924 by statistical analysis of the Bonds Loan sovereign risk 
time series was triggered by market interventions. By then, not only had the 
terms of the Refugee Loan been determined, but the loan itself had already 
been issued.48  
In the text that follows, the breakpoints detected by statistical analysis are 
correlated with historical events that appear to have shaped investors’ 
behaviour on the London Stock Exchange. 
 
5.1. Expectations and Reality: Political Rhetoric versus Market Forces  
In 1916 deals in Greek government bonds on the London market were ‘rare’49 
and did not ‘reflect the unsettled condition of politics’50 in Greece. Prices of 
Greek government bonds were supported by purchases for the sinking fund and 
by wealthy Greeks, in particular by those connected with the shipping 
                                                 
48
 The terms of the Refugee Loan were published on 4th December 1924, a fact that suggests that 
market interventions must have been terminated by that date. See The Times, ‘Terms of Greek Loan’, 
4th December 1924. See also The Times, ‘Greek Government 7% Refugee Loan’, 8th December 1924.  
49
 Greek Extracts, Financier, 21st February 1916; see Table 6 in the Appendix. 
50
 Greek Extracts, Morning Post, 4th October 1916. 
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industry.51  The statistical analysis locates a breakpoint in the Railways Loan 
sovereign risk time series between late March and early April 1916. However, 
dealings on this loan were so sporadic throughout 1916 and at the same time 
both the political and financial conditions in Greece were so complex, that it is 
difficult to isolate the events that may have produced this breakpoint.  
Jubilation at the victory in the Great War soon faded away. During the summer 
of 1919, the first doubts about the presence of Greek troops in Asia Minor were 
openly expressed particularly by France.52 In a report, prepared for the 
Overseas Trade Department in Britain on the economic situation in Greece that 
summer, reservations were expressed about the capacity of Greece to carry out 
her financial obligations even if taxation was increased. This report was never 
circulated, having provoked a strongly negative reaction from the Greek 
government.  
The two time series under scrutiny here show that sovereign risk began to 
increase at the end of 1919 when there had ‘been [a] considerable reduction in 
the quotations of Greek loans’ on the London market.53  The statistical analysis 
of the Bonds Loan risk premium dataset displays a breakpoint early in January 
1920 when an uncomfortable ‘discrepancy between revenue and expenditure’54 
was disclosed, demonstrating a change in investors’ perceptions of the fiscal 
health of the country in that month. The analysis of the country risk based on 
                                                 
51
 Greek Extracts, Morning Post, 4th October 1916. 
52
 History of the Greek Nation (1978, p. 152).  
53
 Greek Extracts, Daily Telegraph, 1st January 1920. 
54
 Greek Extracts, Daily Telegraph, 1st January 1920. 
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the daily dataset of the Railways Loan locates a breakpoint approximately three 
months later than the Bonds Loan, in late March 1920. Both these breakpoints 
indicate that investors considered it a possibility as early as spring 1920 that the 
Greek government would not be able to service its debt and at the same time 
pursue its territorial aspirations in Asia Minor.  
The Bonds Loan time series of sovereign yield spreads then displays a second 
breakpoint in the middle of November 1920, which supports the conventional 
historiography. The timing of this breakpoint coincides with political 
developments in Greece described in Section 2, that the political historiography 
views as crucial to the course of history on the Asia Minor front and economic 
history literature sees as central in explaining the slide of the drachma.  
Geopolitical changes in the area created ‘uncertainty as to the measure in which 
the [Greek] national claims [would] be satisfied’.55 This uncertainty coupled 
with the economic and military capacity of Greece to sustain its presence in 
Asia Minor stimulated the sustained upward trend in Greek sovereign risk on 
the London Stock Exchange.  
 
5.2. The Debacle  
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate graphically why Greek governments faced great 
difficulties, beyond the politics and embargoes referred to in the literature, in 
raising capital on the financial markets to finance the Asia Minor campaign. 
                                                 
55
 The Economist, 25th October 1919. 
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After 1919, Greek government bonds sustained their downward trend and 
consequently the risk premium on Greek government debt rocketed, reflecting 
the decreased credibility of the Greek government as a borrower on the London 
market. The Economist repeatedly reassured holders of Greek government 
bonds that, although the situation in Athens was critical both financially and 
politically, there was no reason to suppose that this would affect the servicing 
of public debt.56  Market signals were also encouraging to investors. In 1920 
the I.F.C. paid bondholders of Greek loans issued before the 1893 default 
which were under its supervision, their full contractual interest rate for the first 
time since the introduction of the Law of Control.57       
 The Asia Minor campaign ended disastrously for Greece in the late summer of 
1922. The effect of this outcome, along with the political changes in the 
country that followed the military defeat, is illustrated dramatically in the 
sovereign yield spreads as expressed by the two time series employed here. The 
statistical analysis of the Bonds Loan time series detects a breakpoint in 
October 1922 during a period when ‘Greek bonds remained out of favour’ at 
the London Stock Exchange.58 This breakpoint reflects the precarious financial 
situation in Athens. A military convention signed at Mudania provided for the 
evacuation of the Greek population from Eastern Thrace.59 Approximately two 
hundred thousand people had to leave the area for Greece ‘in a short space of 
                                                 
56
 The Economist, 22nd October 1921, 4th March 1922 and 5th August 1922. 
57
 Greek Extracts, The Times, 16th March 1920; Financial News, 16th March 1920; S.E. Gazette, 18th 
March 1920; The Times, 23rd March 1920; The Times, 29th March 1920. 
58
 The Times, ‘Stock Exchange’, 15th November 1922; the Bonds Loan was traded twice in October 
1922 while in November of that year no dealings took place on this Greek Loan. 
59
 The convention at Mudania was signed on 11th October 1922. 
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time’.60  ‘Sheltering and feeding’ over a million refugees whilst sustaining the 
‘financial needs of the Treasury’ were the most pressing problems that the 
Revolutionary Committee faced at the time.61 
Clearly developments on the Asia Minor front had a decisive influence on the 
value of the country’s sovereign bonds traded in London. Political 
developments in the country and the determination that the Revolutionary 
Committee showed in handling domestic issues had a strong impact on 
investors’ confidence in the creditworthiness of the Greek government on the 
London market. The value on the London market of the Bonds Loan, for 
example, fell to as low as 16 per cent of face value on 1st December 1922, 
demonstrating a dramatic decrease in public confidence in the Greek 
government.62 This market value of the Bonds Loan amounted to a sovereign 
risk of nearly 21 per cent, a country risk indicating a government approaching 
bankruptcy.63 
 
5.3. Credibility, Commitment and Institutions: Market Reception  
Figures 1 and 2 clearly show that late in 1922 market actors believed that the 
Greek government was approaching default. By contrast, none of the Greek 
                                                 
60
 The Times, ‘A Million Refugees’, 19th October, 1922. 
61
 The Economist, 21st October, 1922. See also The Times, ‘Greece Growing Resigned: Refugee 
Problem’, 7th October 1922; The Times, ‘Big Refugee Plan Needed’, 11th October 1922; The Times, 
‘A Million Refugees’, 19th October 1922. 
62
 For the dramatic events that had occurred in Athens three days before see Yanoulopoulos (1999, pp. 
297-303); History of the Greek Nation (1978, pp. 255-9); Daphnes (1955, pp. 10-20); and Morgenthau 
(1929, pp. 105-6). 
63
 The Railways Loan time series reached its highest point on 29th January 1923 indicating a yield 
spread of approximately ten per cent. 
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governments of the period, despite the difficulties they encountered in 
financing public expenditure, considered default an option. The humiliation of 
the military defeat in 1922, combined with the transaction costs and the 
embarrassment of the 1893 default that still loomed large in politicians’ minds 
in Athens, as well as the belief that foreign aid would be forthcoming, led 
governments to opt for other, often controversial, measures to cover 
expenditure rather than ceasing to honour their interest-bearing obligations.64  
Even the Revolutionary Committee ‘though they had not flinched at taking the 
lives of six of Greece’s most prominent citizens, astonished the world by the 
subsequent moderation … of their rule’65 and did not behave differently. 
Both time series of sovereign risk examined here present a breakpoint in early 
February 1923. These breakpoints and in particular that of the Railways Loan 
time series, since it is the first breakpoint of this dataset located after March 
1920, denote the end of a long period marked by the events that led to the Asia 
Minor debacle. It is possible that these breakpoints in early February 1923 
reflect developments on the diplomatic front. On 30th January 1923, a 
convention was signed in Lausanne between Greece and Turkey for the 
compulsory exchange of populations between the two countries. In addition, 
the Greek government tried to improve its credibility by making positive 
                                                 
64
 The most controversial measure adopted was the Forced Loan of April 1922. The experiment was 
repeated in 1926. 
65
 Morgenthau (1929, p.106). 
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statements in the London press about the fiscal position of the country at a time 
when it was searching for capital to finance the settlement of the refugees.66  
Analysis of the Bonds Loan distinguishes it again from the Railways Loan and 
presents a breakpoint in late December 1923 which reflects the political 
developments in Greece that led to the return, albeit temporarily, of Venizelos 
to the political arena.67 
After unsuccessful attempts to raise capital on the international markets for the 
rehabilitation of refugees, the Greek government turned to the League of 
Nations for assistance. The news that an external loan was to be granted to 
Greece under the auspices of the League, on behalf of the refugees, was first 
announced to the public early in May 1923.68 It took a whole year, however, 
before in May 1924 it was finally confirmed that the Greek Refugee Loan 
would be floated in the following October or November. At the same time the 
Bank of England consented to despatch a second advance for the continuation 
of the settlement of the refugees until the flotation of the Loan.69 The 
breakpoint that the analysis of the Railways Loan time series detects in May 
1924, the last breakpoint that this series presents, coincides with these 
developments as they related to the flotation of the Refugee Loan. It also 
                                                 
66
 The Times, ‘Refugees and the League’, 3rd February 1923; Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 70); 
Minoglou Pepelasi (1989, p. 339 and footnote 13 on p. 360).  
67
 A general election took place in Greece on 16th December 1923. For the political developments that 
followed this general election see: The Times: ‘The Greek General Election’, 15th December 1923; 
‘Greek Elections’, 18th December 1923; ‘Greek Crisis’, 19th December 1923; ‘Greek Regent Sworn 
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signifies the return of the country to the financial markets, for all that this 
return was under the supervision of the League of Nations.  
In the end, the terms and conditions of this loan were finalised and announced 
early in December 1924. On 8th December subscription lists were opened in 
London at 9:45 am but had to be ‘closed at about one minute past ten’ that 
same morning and ‘hundreds of belated applications were excluded’.70 ‘The 
actual result far outstripped the most optimistic expectations’,71 as the Greek 
Refugee Loan was 21 times oversubscribed.72 The breakpoint located in the 
Bonds Loan sovereign risk time series in the middle of December 1924 
correlates with the success of the flotation of the Refugee Loan on the London 
market as this encouraged ‘buying of some of the older Greek loans’.73 
The euphoria created by the success of the Refugee Loan soon faded away. By 
March 1925, it was apparent that the proceeds of this loan would not be 
sufficient to complete the resettlement of the refugees.74  In March 1925, the 
Bonds Loan time series presents the last breakpoint detected by statistical 
analysis. There is no obvious reason that would explain this change in the 
Bonds Loan time series other than that it was by then evident that the 
settlement of the refugees would be a more costly operation than had been 
anticipated. 
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The Refugee Loan sovereign risk time series employed to provide insight into 
the way that investors reacted to news from May 1925 until the end of 1929 
shows that two statistically significant market responses resulted. A breakpoint 
is detected at the beginning of this period, early in July 1925 and a second one 
occurs nearly at the end of the period under scrutiny here, early in October 
1929. See also Table 5. The breakpoint located early in July 1925 was 
produced by unexpected political events in Athens.75 The news of a coup d’état 
on 25th June triggered ‘a sharp decline’ in the value of the Greek Refugee Loan 
on the London market.76 By the time of the breakpoint a new government had 
been formed and the Minister of Finance had already announced both the 
economic policy and the aims of the new government.77 The policy adopted by 
officials was to convince the financial markets that what had happened in 
Athens was ‘a mere change of government’.78      
The final breakpoint located in the time series occurs early in October 1929 
when uncertainty had already begun to loom over the world’s stock exchanges. 
This breakpoint might reflect developments related to new borrowing by the 
Greek government, as described briefly in the last paragraph of this section.  
The statistical analysis of the Refugee Loan time series does not reveal any 
breakpoints between July 1925 and the implementation of a League of Nations 
stabilisation plan in 1928. However, it is apparent as Figure 1 shows, that 
                                                 
75
 See Daphnes (1955, pp. 276-95). 
76
 The Times, ‘Fall in Greek Bonds’, 26th June 1925. 
77
 See Greek Extracts: Financial News, 1st July 1925; Financial News, 6th July 1925. The Times, 
‘Greek Government Crisis Ended’ and ‘New Greek Government’, 2nd July 1925.  
78
 Greek Extracts, Financial News, 8th July 1925. 
  42
eventual stabilisation and the concomitant institutional reforms had already 
been factored into the market value of the bonds and consequently the 
creditworthiness of the Greek government improved on the London market. 
There are no breakpoints corresponding to events that the literature regards as 
playing a significant role in achieving monetary stability: that is to say the 
elections of November 1926, settlement of war debts with Great Britain,79 
resorting to the League of Nations in 1927, and finally the flotation of the 
Stabilisation Loan in 1928. Crucially, there is no statistically significant change 
that coincides with the establishment of the central bank and de jure 
stabilisation of the drachma.  
The central banking reforms and the adoption of the Gold Exchange Standard 
in Greece in 1928 would hardly have taken investors by surprise.80 Both events 
had been publicised in the press. In addition, there was generally a lengthy time 
span between the initial, possibly informal, announcement and the 
promulgation of the reforms. Statements about the Greek government’s 
intention to stabilise the drachma appeared in the British press as early as July 
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192581 and the matter was frequently in the news up to the de jure 
stabilisation.82 The formal announcement and the timing of de jure stabilisation 
of the drachma close to its market value were therefore anticipated by market 
participants. The drachma had been de facto stabilised for a whole year before 
May 1928 and the monetary authorities as well as government officials 
involved, advocated at every opportunity legal stabilisation without 
‘revalorisation’.83 
News about possible central banking reforms in Greece appeared in the British 
press on the same day that the Greek representatives in Geneva officially asked 
the Council to authorise a stabilisation loan for Greece. The Financial News of 
15th June reported that, under the League’s scheme, the National Bank of 
Greece ‘would be transformed into an issue bank and would engage a foreign 
advisor’.84 Some of these central banking reforms would in any event have 
been anticipated by the markets, as they were an integral part of all the League-
sponsored reconstruction schemes that had preceded the Greek stabilisation 
plan. Three weeks later, The Economist published a long article on the 
negotiations between Greek officials and the Financial Committee of the 
League. It was reported that a prerequisite for the flotation of a League-
sponsored loan was that the Greek parliament authorise ‘the gradual conversion 
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of the National Bank of Greece into a central bank of issue of modern type’.85 
By that time, however, not only had the manner of central banking reform in 
Greece been agreed upon, but the statutes of the new bank of issue had been 
drafted.86  Discussions between the Greek side and the representatives of the 
League were difficult, as there was a fundamental disagreement over the way 
central banking reforms should be implemented in the country.87 
The architects of reform at first withheld news of the establishment of the Bank 
of Greece and then manipulated the way in which the news was released. The 
first reference to the creation of a new central bank appeared in the Greek press 
as an option under consideration on 17th July, the day that the Ministers of 
Finance and Foreign Affairs returned to Athens.88 The first public 
announcements by the Minister of Finance to the press stated clearly that two 
plans were being considered and that the government was thinking of either 
transforming ‘the National Bank into a pure bank of issue by transferring all its 
other functions to another bank’ or of forming ‘a new independent bank of 
issue’.89 By early August 1927, details of the sweeping reforms had been made 
public, as had the opposition of the leader of the Populist Party to the 
arrangements laid down by the Geneva Protocol. As a result, the Populist Party 
withdrew from the coalition government objecting to the establishment of a 
new, fully-fledged central bank. Political opposition did not endanger the 
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reforms however. A reshuffled government brought the stabilisation plan to 
parliament, which in the absence of the Populist Party ratified it the following 
December. Previously, the Council of the League had approved the scheme in 
its September session.  
The London press reported developments in Athens as they unfolded.90 A 
statistically significant market reaction might be expected, reflecting the 
announcement of the imminent establishment of the Bank of Greece. In fact, 
statistical analysis of the daily observations of the Refugee Loan shows that 
financial market actors’ behaviour was not dramatically influenced by the 
news. Market prices of Greek government bonds, however, did respond to the 
information available. Bond prices drifted gradually upwards as news of 
institutional changes in Athens reached the market and consequently, as Figure 
1 illustrates, the spread between the yield of the Refugee Loan and the British 
consol steadily declined.  
The political authorities expected that institutional developments resulting in 
the establishment of a central bank and the adoption of the Gold Exchange 
Standard would facilitate an influx of foreign capital essential for economic 
growth. However, the impact of these institutional reforms, at least in the short 
term, on the cost and of course the volume of Greek borrowing ‘should reflect 
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external circumstances as well’.91 By May 1928 the Greek government had 
over-borrowed and the international economy was about to enter the most 
severe depression ever experienced. A few months after Greece adopted the 
Gold Exchange Standard, in December 1928, a loan for public works with a 
nominal value of four million pounds was issued on the London market, on 
similar terms to those of the Stabilisation Loan. Only one third of this loan was 
covered. A month later, in January 1929, the Greek government signed an 
agreement with Seligman & Co for a loan with a nominal value of up to 54 
million dollars.92  The agreement provided for the flotation of a loan on terms 
similar to the Stabilisation Loan on the condition that the I.F.C. would assume 
responsibility for its service. Seligman would take responsibility for any part of 
the loan that remained uncovered. On 30th October 1929 the Evening Standard 
announced the cancellation of this loan.93 The official reason for the 
termination of this agreement was that the I.F.C. had refused to assume 
responsibility for the service of this loan.94 The timing of the termination of the 
agreement, however, is more revealing than the official announcement.  
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper three daily time series of sovereign risk have been compiled using 
Greek government loans denominated in gold and traded on the London Stock 
Exchange, benchmarked against the British consol and analysed statistically. 
The aim has been to shed light on historical events, including political and 
institutional developments that shaped investors’ expectations of the capacity 
of the Greek government to honour its debt obligations between the outbreak of 
the First World War and the advent of the Great Depression. Thus this work 
contributes to the literature that explores the way that historical events, 
including institutional changes, interact with capital markets to determine asset 
prices. 
The daily time series of Greek sovereign risk analysed here demonstrate that 
during the Great War, country risk remained low. Subsequently, however, the 
value of Greek bonds traded on the London Stock Exchange decreased 
dramatically in response to developments in Asia Minor and consequently the 
risk premium soared. News relating to the military campaign in Asia Minor 
became a proxy for fiscal performance. In early 1923, the Greek default risk 
started falling slowly and by the end of the period in question it had dropped 
considerably reflecting the improvement in the creditworthiness of the Greek 
government on the London market.  
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It is a genuine challenge, using advanced statistical analysis, to attempt to 
understand what caused changes in investors’ behaviour during such a complex 
historical period. The sovereign risk time series, analysed statistically here, 
clearly show that investors acted upon news of fiscal performance and public 
debt developments. Political events and in particular political changes that had 
not been anticipated also influenced the behaviour of investors’ in Greek 
government debt.     
Institutional innovations such as de jure adoption of the Gold Exchange 
Standard and the establishment of a central bank de novo did not produce any 
quantitative market reaction. Formal announcements on institutional changes 
such as the adoption of the Gold Exchange Standard and the establishment of a 
central bank were unlikely to contain new information. These reforms generally 
take a long time to be promulgated and need to be ratified by parliament. 
Market actors observed and evaluated every step taken towards stabilisation 
carefully. As a result, stabilisation and the concomitant institutional reforms 
were gradually factored into the market price of Greek sovereign debt traded in 
London. The credibility of the Greek government on the London market 
improved and consequently the cost of capital was lowered.  
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Appendix  
 
 
Table 6. Total Number of Trading Days per Loan on the London Stock 
Exchange, 1914-1925 
 
 Railways Loan Bonds Loan 
19141 25 3 
1915 23 0 
1916 14 0 
1917 36 6 
1918 19 3 
1919 34 7 
1920 79 77 
1921 65 11 
1922 62 25 
1923 92 56 
1924 108 122 
19252 39 54 
Total: 596 364 
Notes: 1 Number of observations from 1st January 1914 until 30th July 1914.  Between 30th 
July and 31st December 1914 the London Stock Exchange remained closed.  2 Number of 
observations from 1st January 1925 until 29th April 1925. 
Source: See text. 
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